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Criminal Law and Procedure. State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d
474 (R.I. 2020). The Rhode Island Supreme Court applies an abuse
of discretion standard of review when analyzing a trial justice’s
decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence. If the record provides support for the trial
justice’s decision, abuse of discretion is not found.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In September 2017, the defendant, Eric Mensah (Mensah) was
convicted for sexual assault charges against his daughter, Emma,1
who was eight years old at the time.2 Specifically, Mensah was
charged with two counts each of first-degree and second-degree
child molestation sexual assault.3 In 2014, Emma moved into her
father’s apartment located in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, after
relocating from Ghana.4 In December of 2015, Emma revealed to
her babysitter, Luz Velez (Velez) that she had been sexually
assaulted by her father shortly after her arrival from Ghana.5 This
disclosure to Velez, along with an investigation of the defendant,
culminated in Mensah’s indictment on May 6, 2016.6 On June 8,
2016, Mensah pled not guilty to the charges.7 Mensah’s trial took
place on September 14, 2017, where Emma revealed the details of
her father’s sexual abuse.8 Emma testified that shortly after
arriving from Ghana, in the summer of 2014, defendant assaulted
her for twenty to thirty minutes while she and defendant “took a

1. State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d 474, 476 (R.I. 2020). “Emma” is a pseudonym the court uses to protect the identity of the minor child. Id. at 476 n.1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 476–77.
7. Id. at 477.
8. Id.
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nap together after coming home from a meat store.”9 While lying
on the bed, “defendant removed the blanket that was covering
Emma, took off her clothes and turned her over.”10 Defendant then
proceeded to “touch the inside of her ‘butt’ as his body ‘moved up
and down’” and inserted his finger into her vagina.11 Defendant
halted his abuse when Emma told defendant she would call the
police if he did not stop.12 Promising a trip to Chuck E. Cheese the
next day, Mensah instructed Emma to keep what had happened to
herself.13 Defendant further threatened to send Emma back to
Ghana if she told anyone what had occurred in the apartment.14
Emma further testified about the details of the July 23, 2015,
incident (“the lost earring incident”).15 After losing an earring,
defendant warned Emma she would not attend a field trip the next
day if she did not find it.16 However, even though she eventually
found the earring, Mensah nevertheless proceeded to beat his
daughter with a hanger.17 Hearing gagging noises and screaming
while leaving the apartment complex, Timothy Orr, who lived on
the floor above Mensah called the police after knocking on Mensah’s
door with no response.18 When the police came, Mensah instructed
Emma to get in the shower.19 At trial, when the police revealed
that Emma had told them she was “fine,”20 she explained that she
lied to them in order to avoid a beating from her father.21 Emma
also testified about three other incidents of sexual abuse by
Mensah.22 Ultimately, Emma revealed her abuse to her babysitter,
Velez, after watching an episode of Forensic Files which involved a
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 479.
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rape and murder.23 At trial, Mensah’s brother, sister-in-law, and a
friend with whom he grew up in Ghana testified on his behalf.24
Seeking to admit additional evidence of both sexual and nonsexual
abuse and conduct by Mensah, including reports about Mensah
asking his daughter about her intimate parts and additional sexual
contact initiated by defendant, the State filed a motion in limine.25
The State was especially interested in bringing in evidence of
Mensah’s nonsexual abuse, including a July 23, 2015, incident
when police were called to defendant’s home, and an incident in
which Mensah had used a hanger to hit his daughter.26
The State argued the evidence should be admitted under rule
404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because the evidence
helped explain why Emma was afraid to disclose the sexual abuse,
how the abuse stopped suddenly, and why Emma feared no one
would believe her allegations.27 Defendant, however, argued that
the alleged acts that occurred on July 23 were not sufficiently
similar to the charges against the defendant to be admissible.28 In
particular, defendant argued that the conduct on July 23 was not
sexual in nature, and therefore was not similar to the current
charges.29 In addition, Mensah argued that evidence of other
alleged sexual abuse was inadmissible “because it was uncharged,
prejudicial evidence.”30 The trial justice explained that she would
allow evidence of the July 23 charges but exclude evidence that
“defendant’s pants were unbuttoned.”31 In addition, evidence of the
defendant’s other alleged “uncharged sexual contact” would be
admitted because “the evidence would tend to demonstrate [a] lewd
disposition toward [Emma], intent, plan, opportunity, or design.”32
Utilizing Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Mensah moved for a new trial, arguing there was
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. at 479.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 477.
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insufficient evidence to charge him with penile penetration of his
daughter’s anus and digital penetration of his daughter’s vagina.33
Defendant pointed to a previous court holding, In re B.H.,34 in
making his argument that there was “insufficient [evidence] to
prove anal penetration,” comparing Emma’s testimony to the
testimony given at the In re B.H. trial.35 Mensah further argued
that Emma’s “imprecise” and “vague” testimony did not support
count two of the charge.36 Defendant argued that the “weight of the
evidence was insufficient for a conviction, specifically contending
that Emma was not a believable witness.”37
Ultimately, the trial justice denied Mensah’s motion for a new
trial.38 In her bench decision, the trial justice addressed both the
‘insufficient evidence’ argument and the ‘weight of the evidence’
argument.39 The trial justice first explained the standard used
when presented with an argument dealing with the weight of the
evidence.40 While she thought Mensah “probably was” guilty, she
revealed that had she been a juror she would not have thought the
State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.41 However, the
trial justice stated that reasonable minds could differ.42 In regard
to the insufficient evidence argument, the trial justice pointed to In
re B.H. to distinguish Mensah’s current case.43 Because Emma had
“reported anal pain” and testified that “defendant was moving back
and forth,” the trial justice found this evidence to be sufficient.44

33. Id. at 482.
34. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
35. Mensah, 227 A.3d at 482.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The trial justice noted that Emma’s testimony about “anal pain,”
coupled with her description of defendant’s movements, were “more than the
complainant in In re B.H. had testified to.” Id. As a result, the trial justice
deemed Emma’s testimony sufficient enough to evidence anal penetration. Id.
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After trial, Mensah appealed his case to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.45
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, Mensah put forth two arguments. First, Mensah
argued that “the July 2015 ‘lost earring’ incident should not have
been admitted under Rule 404(b).”46 Secondly, Mensah argued that
the “trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial.”47 The
Court began its analysis by stating that the abuse of discretion
standard is the proper standard of review when reviewing a trial
court’s decision to admit Rule 404(b) evidence.48 In addition, the
Court noted that a trial justice does not abuse their discretion
where the record provides an explanation supporting the decision
made by the trial justice.49
A. Rule 404(b) Evidence
Addressing the first issue—whether the July 2015 incident was
properly admitted—the Court provided an explanation of the raiseor-waive rule. In particular, the rule mandates litigants to “raise
all their claims for relief in the trial court and properly articulate
them to a judge for a ruling.”50 After noting Mensah’s only objection
to the admission of the July 2015 incident was at the state’s motion
in limine, the Court stated firmly that this objection was not enough
to preserve the evidentiary issue on appeal.51 The Court explained
its reasoning behind the statement, pointing to prior holdings
which made clear that a motion in limine was “preliminary in
nature” and, therefore, provided no finality on questions pertaining
to the admissibility of evidence.52 As such, Mensah’s ability to
appeal the admissibility issue in regard to the July 23, 2015,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483 (citing State v. Perry, 182 A.3d 558, 568 (R.I. 2018)).
Id. (quoting State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 1182 (R.I. 2018)).
Id. at 483 (citing State v. Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1194 (R.I 2019)).
Id.
Id. (State v. Colon, 198 A.3d 1249, 1255 (R.I. 2019)).
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incident had effectively been waived as a result of his failure to
raise a timely objection at trial.53
B. Motion for a New Trial
Next, the Court addressed defendant’s claim that the trial
justice erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial. The
Court began by explaining that “it is well settled that a defendant
arguing a motion for a new trial may do so on [either] 1)
insufficiency of the evidence or 2) weight of the evidence.”54 Noting
Mensah’s argument mingled the two bases together, the Court
proceeded to divide its analysis of Mensah’s argument.55
1.

Insufficiency of the Evidence

The Court first addressed defendant’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence.56 When reviewing a trial justice’s decision on
an ‘insufficiency of the evidence’ basis, the Court explained, a de
novo standard of review is applied and the Court “examine[s] the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”57 Therefore, a
guilty verdict by a jury will not be overturned unless the Court
concludes that “no reasonable jury could have rendered it.”58
Likewise, a trial justice must read the evidence in favor of the
prosecution when a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge is
presented.59 In doing so, the trial justice must examine the
evidence “without assessing the weight of the evidence or the
credibility of the witnesses, and draw all reasonable inferences
consistent with guilt, mindful that the jury likewise has done so.”60
Accordingly, the Court stated the definition of sexual
penetration61 as written in the Rhode Island General Laws section
53. See id. at 484.
54. Id. (quoting State v. McDonald, 157 A.3d 1080, 1088 (R.I. 2017)).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 485.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)).
59. See id. at 484.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court defines sexual penetration as follows:
Sexual penetration is defined in our general laws as[ ] ‘sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight,
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11-37-1(8).62 After stating the definition of sexual penetration,
which includes “anal intercourse,” the Court proceeded to
distinguish Mensah’s case from In re B.H., a case in which the Court
found that the charge of first-degree child molestation was based on
insufficient evidence.63 In Mensah’s case, however, the Court found
Emma’s testimony sufficient because, unlike In re B.H., Emma’s
testimony was “more precise[ ]” and “[more] detail[ed].”64 Because
Emma’s testimony was sufficient to support Mensah’s charge of
first-degree child molestation, the Court stated that the trial justice
properly rejected Mensah’s motion for a new trial on “sufficiency
grounds.”65
2.

Weight of the Evidence

Next the Court addressed defendant’s argument regarding the
weight of the evidence. When reviewing a trial justice’s decision on
a “weight of the evidence” basis, the Court’s review of the trial
justice’s decision is deferential.66 The Court explained the proper
procedure a trial justice must take when presented with a motion
for a new trial on weight of the evidence grounds: acting as a
“thirteenth juror,” the trial justice independently assesses the
evidence by considering the “credibility of the witnesses and . . . the
weight of the evidence.”67
The Court highlighted that absent clear error or a
misconception of the evidence, the trial justice’s decision will not be
overturned so long as the trial justice “articulates adequate
grounds” for the decision.68 Disagreeing with Mensah’s contention
that “no reasonable mind could have found him guilty of the
charges” and finding that the trial justice applied the appropriate

by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings
of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the accused’s instruction, but emission of semen is not required.
Id. (quoting 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-37-1(8)).
62. See id. at 485.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 486.
67. Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1050–51 (R.I. 2019)).
68. Id.
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standard of review, the Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of
Mensah’s motion for a new trial.69
COMMENTARY

This case undoubtedly provides an excellent example of the
imperative of meticulously studying all facets of relevant caselaw,
paying particular attention to all the rules and procedures
governing courtroom procedures. Defendant’s argument that the
State had the means to present its case using less prejudicial
evidence is compelling, but one can only speculate whether
Mensah’s appeal would have secured a better outcome had counsel
raised a timely objection to the State’s presentation of the July 2015
incident.
The Court’s explanation regarding its belief that the State
presented sufficient evidence of sexual penetration is quite
straightforward, but it would have been helpful had the Court also
provided guidelines and instruction about the required details
necessary for evidencing sexual penetration. But Mensah, at least,
seems to indicate that reports of pain is a compelling factor in the
Court’s analysis. Despite the need for more instruction regarding
evidence of sexual penetration, the Court does an efficient job
providing a thorough explanation of its reasoning as it pertains to
its holding in Mensah.
CONCLUSION

The Court ultimately rejected defendant’s argument that
reasonable minds could not have found him guilty of the charges.70
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision,
holding that the trial justice applied the proper standard of review
and, therefore, appropriately denied defendant’s motion for a new
trial after finding that reasonable minds could differ from her own
conclusions.71
Ruth C. Nwauche

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

